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Abstract: This descriptive study makes a longitudinal analysis of the ownership 
structure of Spanish companies in innovative economic sectors. Our purpose is to 
contribute to the inconclusive research that analyses the impact of ownership structure 
on innovation by describing who the main blockholders of innovative companies in 
Spain are, determining the influence of domestic versus foreign capital, and exploring 
whether there are any significant differences when different time periods and different 
innovative sectors are compared. We collected data from 86 Spanish companies in 
innovative sectors between 2003 and 2014 (inclusive) which supplied a total of 898 
observations. The results confirm that Spanish capital plays a bigger role than foreign 
capital in the ownership structure of Spanish innovative sectors, and that concentrated 
ownership by the board of directors, especially by affiliated directors, is also important. 
There are significant differences in the ownership structure of Spanish innovative 
sectors. However, its evolution over time is quite stable, with the exception of the 
proportion of executive ownership. 
Keywords: Ownership structure; institutional ownership; domestic ownership, foreign 
ownership, typology of blockholders, innovative sectors, Spain
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1. Introduction
Previous research has shown the relevance of innovation for company survival 
and success (Kor, 2006). Innovation strategies allow companies to improve their 
competitive position (Wadhwa and Kotha, 2006) and their performance in the 
long-term (Zhou, 2006).
Companies’ internal and external innovation strategies are influenced by 
numerous factors (Cassiman and Veugelers, 2006). From an internal perspective, 
corporate governance strongly affects corporate strategies, since it explains how 
the power of decision-making is distributed and shared within organisations. 
Previous research has highlighted the role played by ownership structure 
(Hoskisson et alii, 2002) as a crucial internal factor that influences decision-
making and corporate strategies.
Corporate governance literature emphasises ownership structure as the most 
important research topic attempting to link corporate governance and innovation. 
According to Gonzales-Bustos and Hernández-Lara (2016), ownership 
structure is the most cited research topic in this literature, and features in more 
than 20.6% of the research papers that analyse this relationship; furthermore, 
its importance is growing over time. More specifically, ownership concentration 
and the existence of blockholders are traits of corporate governance that are 
particularly important in certain contexts and governance models, and analysing 
the influences of these blockholders on innovation has been considered a priority 
by previous research.
As far as the effects that ownership structure has on innovation, as we have 
mentioned above, the focus has been on the influence of ownership concentration 
(Kochhar and David, 1996; David et alii, 2001), and on the effects on innovation 
of different types of blockholders: for example, institutional (Choi et alii, 2011; 
2012; David et alii, 2001; Kochhar and David, 1996), public (Choi et alii, 2011; 
Xiao and Zhao, 2012; Zeng and Lin, 2011), financial (Tribo et alii, 2007), or 
family ownership (Block, 2012; Chang et alii, 2006; Chen and Hsu, 2009). 
However, academic research has not reached a clear consensus on the effects that 
these characteristics of ownership structure finally exert on innovation. Some 
authors have found a positive association between ownership concentration and 
innovation efforts, measured as R&D investments (Lee, 2012), whilst others 
have found a negative association (Brunninge et alii, 2007; Ortega-Argiles et alii, 
2005; Zeng and Lin, 2011). And some studies have not been able to demonstrate 
any effects, positive or negative, of ownership concentration on innovation (Choi 
et alii, 2011; 2012). These incongruent results obtained by previous research 
have been explained by other kinds of effect, not only direct, but for example an 
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inverted U-shape link, which would explain that when ownership concentration 
grows, its effect on innovation can be positive in a first stage, but afterwards 
can turn into negative when concentration becomes excessive (Liu, 2012). On 
the other hand, some other authors have explained the potential moderator 
effect exerted by blockholders. For example, Tsao and Chen (2012) considered 
that ownership concentration might moderate the relationship between 
internationalisation and innovation. Kim et alii (2008) studied how significant 
shareholders might moderate the association between the lack of financial 
resources and R&D investments, concluding that familiar ownership exerts a 
positive moderation effect, whilst institutional ownership and foreign capital 
have a negative moderation influence. Therefore, most studies try to justify the 
lack of consensus of the effects of ownership concentration considering that not 
all significant shareholders are the same. They do not constitute a homogeneous 
group with the same interests and objectives. On the contrary, they are different; 
they want and look for different goals and, therefore can exert different influences 
with their acts and decisions. But even so, when one specific type of blockholder 
is under analysis, not always its influences on innovation are clear.
The main objective of this study is to carry out a longitudinal descriptive 
research on the ownership structure of Spanish companies belonging to 
innovative sectors. Our purpose is to contribute to the inconclusive research 
that analyses the impact of ownership structure on innovation, describing 
who the main blockholders of innovative companies in Spain are, determining 
the influence of domestic versus foreign capital, and exploring whether some 
significant differences can be found or not when comparing over time and also 
among different innovative sectors. 
Our results confirm that the most common major shareholders in the case 
of innovative companies in Spain are directors and shareholders of the same 
country. Among the different types of directors, affiliated directors are the most 
relevant in terms of the percentage of shares they hold in such companies. The 
lowest percentages of capital are those held by institutional owners, excluding 
financial institutions, and those held by executives directors. There are significant 
differences in the ownership structure of different Spanish innovative sectors, 
but the most and least relevant shareholders, in terms of their concentrated 
ownership, were almost the same in all the sectors compared. In addition, 
ownership structure in Spanish companies belonging to innovative economic 
sectors was stable over time. All in all, our results confirm that ownership 
structure in Spanish companies does not seem to foster an appropriate innovative 
environment for innovation.
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We aim to contribute to the literature not by trying to explain or predict 
innovation indicators through ownership structure, which is beyond our goal, 
but by analysing how is the ownership structure of innovative companies in 
Spain, who are their main shareholders, and if are there any differences when 
comparing companies of different innovative sectors and over time. 
2. Literature review on the effects of ownership 
structure on innovation
There are many studies that suggest and try to demonstrate what the effects 
of ownership structure on innovation are, but few conclusive results have been 
finally reached, which makes this research line an interesting topic for academia. 
Past researchers consider different theoretical perspectives to describe this 
relationship, being the most relevant ones, the agency and the stewardship 
theories. The agency theory highlights some key assumptions on the opportunistic 
behaviour of individuals, interested in satisfying their own objectives and goals. 
It could cause some agency costs in the case of organisations where there is 
separation between ownership and control (Eisenhardt, 1989). From the agency 
theory perspective, ownership structure is a key determinant of the innovation 
orientation of companies (Belloc, 2012), and more specifically, of R&D 
investments (Lee and O’Neil, 2003). Also, this theory points out the incentives 
of blockholders to influence and control managers’ decisions (Grossman and 
Hart, 1980). 
The stewardship theory, on the other hand, assumes that managers are 
trustworthy individuals and believes that the different economic agents in 
companies are interested and will take profit at the end if the company’s wealth 
improves (Davis et alii, 1997). Therefore, the interests of these agents, including 
managers and shareholders, would be aligned. This theoretical perspective, 
which has been not as important as the agency theory in previous research (Fox 
and Hamilton, 1994), also establishes that from its assumptions, shareholders 
wouldn’t be interested in controlling and influencing managers’ decisions.
From the opposite assumptions of these theoretical frameworks, it is not 
strange the scarce consensus found in previous research on the relationship 
between ownership structure and innovation. In the following sections, a 
literature review on the main arguments used by previous research to explain this 
association is exposed, considering the cases of the main types of blockholders.
15RIO, Nº 16, 2016
A descriptive longitudinal analysis of the ownership structure of Spanish innovative companies
2.1 Domestically vs foreign-owned companies
Academic research underlines multiple differences between domestic and foreign 
ownership (Bellak, 2004), and its influence on innovation orientation is one of 
them. In this regard, previous research frequently agrees that domestically owned 
enterprises show a lower propensity to innovate (Britton, 2013; Love et alii, 
2009). According to these studies, domestic ownership does not exert a significant 
influence on companies’ innovation decisions (Dachs et alii, 2008). For example, 
Barros (2015) points out that both, domestically and foreign-owned companies, 
show the same innovative behaviour when the institutional environment is weak, 
not being evidence of significant differences among them. Other scholars have 
argued that it could be expected a negative influence of domestic ownership 
on innovation efforts (HyeogUg and Tomohiko, 2013). Dachs et alii (2008), 
for example, analysed how strong foreign-owned firms were embedded in the 
innovation systems of their host countries and found that foreign ownership is 
associated with similar levels of innovation input, but higher level of innovation 
output than domestically owned enterprises. This major propensity to innovate 
is influenced by the higher propensity to co-operate of affiliates of foreign 
multinationals with domestic partners than domestically owned companies.
Therefore, academic research has normally identified foreign ownership 
as one of the main drivers for international innovation and R&D activities 
(Choi et alii, 2011; Dachs et alii, 2008). According to these scholars, foreign 
ownership is directly associated with R&D activities through the role of foreign-
owned enterprises’ subsidiaries (Serapio and Dalton, 1999).  As a matter of 
fact, numerous authors advocate for a positive influence of foreign ownership 
on innovation (Choi et alii, 2011; Love et alii, 2009; Resende et alii, 2014) and, 
more specifically, on R&D expenses (Ferris and Park, 2005; Hwang et alii, 2013; 
Lee, 2012; HyeogUg and Tomohiko, 2013). These authors argue that foreign 
ownership offers better options to access to resources for innovation and R&D 
development (Brugger and Stuckey, 1987; Choi et alii, 2011), allow technological 
resources to be transferred, a major technical collaboration, and higher exchange 
of managerial resources and funding (Love et alii, 2009). 
2.2 Institutional blockholders and financial owners
Previous research has highlighted the relevance of institutional blockholders on 
companies’ performance and results (McConnell and Servaes, 1990), and their 
orientation towards innovation (David et alii, 2001). In many countries, a high 
number of research and innovation projects have been possible thanks to the 
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direct investments of different kind of institutions (Choi et alii, 2011). Various 
studies have empirically corroborated these positive effects of institutional 
blockholders on innovation (Choi et alii, 2011; 2012; David et alii, 2001; 
Kochhar and David, 1996), and on R&D investments (Brossard et alii, 2013; 
Ferris and Park, 2005; Hill and Snell, 1988; Tribo et alii, 2007; Wahal and 
McConnell, 2000). According to these scholars, institutional investors are willing 
to promote innovative initiatives that contribute to a higher company’s viability 
and competitiveness.
Nevertheless, not all the scholars agree with these positive influences, 
underlining that some institutional investors can be reluctant to risky and long-
term investments (Graves, 1988). Therefore, the type of institutional owners 
may be decisive to determine their influence on innovation. Also, some studies 
consider other characteristics of institutional investors that can also affect their 
influence on innovation, for example, the term of the investments; long-term 
investments of institutional blockhoders positively affect innovation, whilst 
short-term investments exert a negative influence (Zahra, 1996). Finally, some 
research did not found any significant influence of institutional blockholders on 
innovation (Lee, 2012).
In order to clarify these conflicting propositions, researchers’ tendency to 
view these investors as a monolithic group is changing (Zahra, 1996). One of the 
most relevant institutional owners that have attracted the interest of research are 
financial owners, like banks and other financial institutions. These institutions 
usually act as a key source of financial capital for great R&D projects. In some 
countries, such as Germany, Spain, Japan and Sweden, banks are one of the 
most relevant companies’ shareholders. They act as guarantors of innovation 
investments (Miozzo and Dewick, 2002), which support the positive association 
between banks ownership and R&D investment, long-term commitments, 
and innovation (Lee, 2005; Miozzo and Dewick, 2002). However, literature 
is not always consistent regarding the effects of financial owners on R&D and 
innovation. There are studies that did not find any significant effect of financial 
owners on innovation (Kochhar and David, 1996). Others found a significant 
negative association of this kind of blockholders on innovation (Tribo et alii, 
2007), mainly explained by the business relationship that banks maintain with 
the firm in which they invest beyond simple ownership, in the form of loans 
and credits, which expose banks, normally conservative institutions, to the 
uncertainty of R&D and innovation.
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2.3 Great shareholders of the same economic sector vs great 
shareholders belonging to others economic sectors
The economic activity developed by the company is one relevant factor of their 
innovative behaviour. There is a scarce body of research analysing the relationship 
between different types of relevant owners in terms of their economic activity and 
innovation. Among the studies interested in that, the most relevant arguments 
are based on the positive association of ownership belonging to companies of 
the same sector, with innovation activities and R&D spending (Ito et alii, 2012), 
because normally the impact of companies’ investments coming from the same 
sector is stronger and more committed in the long-term than investments 
coming from other industries (Harris and Moffat, 2013). These results have been 
supported most of the times in the case of multinational companies, where the 
subsidiaries in the host country gain a greater access to resources and a greater 
global connectivity beneficial for innovation, when the parent company and the 
subsidiaries belong to the same industry (Crescenzi et alii, 2015).
The studies that specifically analyse the effect of significant owners from other 
sectors on innovation do not arrive either to conclusive results. On the one hand, 
authors like Miozzo and Dewick (2002) argued a positive relationship, based 
on the possibility of national companies to invest in specific innovation activities 
in which they are interested as a consequence of investments that come from 
companies in other sectors. Van der Elsta (2004), on the other hand, pointed 
out that different industries do not share the same characteristics, interests and 
needs, which explain that investments from other economic sector do not favour 
innovation.
2.4 Ownership held by the board: executive, affiliated and 
independent ownership
Previous research has highlighted the influence that directors’ ownership can 
exert on firms’ innovative behaviour (Westphal and Zajac, 1995). However, again 
conclusive results were not found in this research. Scholars like Hoskisson et alii 
(1993) or Zahra (1996) established that board ownership drove to a greater look 
for their self-interest, and this could motivate directors to increase their efforts 
to get external resources to foster innovation. However, lately other authors, like 
Kim and Kim (2015) have not found any significant relationship between stocks 
held by the board and innovation.
This lack of agreement can respond to the different types of directors involved 
in the board. Firstly, executive ownership refers to stocks held by directors closely 
18 19RIO, Nº 16, 2016
Juan Pablo Gonzales-Bustos, Ana Beatriz Hernández-Lara
related to managerial positions. In companies where shareholders also participate 
in management, the board can be more centred in its strategic function and less 
in its monitoring and control roles (Brunninge et alii, 2007; Chen and Hsu, 
2009).  Under these arguments, previous research has stated that executive 
ownership exerts a positive influence on risky strategies favouring innovation 
(Zajac and Westphal, 1994). Zahra (1996) also found evidence on the positive 
association between executive ownership and innovation. Some possible 
explanations arise from the fact that executive owners show a major propensity 
to invest in long-term projects instead of maximizing benefits in the short-term 
(Sundaramurthy and Lewis, 2003). Nevertheless, executive owners could also 
exert a negative influence on risky strategies ( Jensen and Meckling, 1976) due 
to the deceleration that they cause on innovation spending (Choi et alii, 2011; 
Latham and Braun, 2009; Zeng and Lin, 2011). Other studies analysed the 
moderating effects provoked by executive ownership. For example, Kim and Kim 
(2015) found evidences on the positive moderating effect of executive ownership 
on the relationship between board capital diversity and innovation results, which 
maintain an inverted U-shaped relationship. Hernández-Lara et alii (2014), 
on the other hand, did not find any significant effect of executive owners on 
innovation.
Secondly, previous research has pointed out that affiliated ownership could 
reduce agency costs (Chang, 2003; Chang and Hong, 2000), favouring risky 
strategies. According to these studies, stocks held by affiliated directors make 
stronger the links with other companies and the access to a wider network. 
Overall, this can improve the advice received by managers and exert a positive 
influence on innovation. Other authors, like Hernández-Lara et alii (2010; 
2014), argued that affiliated ownership significantly and positively moderates 
the relationship between the proportion of affiliated directors and innovation. 
According to them, affiliated ownership can empower affiliated directors and 
makes them more actively involved in their monitoring and control functions, 
improving the companies’ innovation strategies when their representation in the 
board growths. 
Finally, independent directors who hold significant percentages of shares 
are more involved in discussions within the companies about their innovative 
orientation (Zahra, 1996). According to Hoskisson et alii (1993), independent 
directors with significant stocks show a higher propensity to risky projects, 
like R&D spending and innovation. Other scholars stated a moderating effect 
exerted by this kind of owners, because they can mitigate the negative association 
between a high proportion of executive directors and innovation (Zahra, 1996).
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In this literature review on the effects of ownership structure on innovation, 
it has become clear the inconclusive results of this research. We aim to contribute 
to the literature not by trying to explain or predict innovation indicators through 
ownership structure, but by analysing how is the ownership structure of 
innovative companies in Spain, who are their main shareholders, and if are there 
any differences when comparing companies of different innovative sectors and 
over time. 
3. Methodology
3.1 Data collection
The data were collected from Spanish companies listed on the Spanish stock 
exchange between 2003 and 2014. We initiated the data collection in 2003 
coinciding with the publication of the Aldama report (2003), and the relevance 
given to corporate governance issues in the Spanish context (Gonzales-Bustos 
and Hernández-Lara, 2014). 
Using information from the Spanish Institute of Statistics, we selected firms 
from sectors that showed significantly high innovation indicators, such as the 
percentage of innovative firms (above 50%), innovation intensity (above 1.5%), 
and the percentage of income generated by new or improved products (above 
10%). Considering the divisions or sections of the National Classification 
of Economic Activity (NACE 2009) in Spain (INE, 2009), five sectors were 
included: energy and water supply, extractives, construction, industry and 
services, all of them considered as innovative economic sectors. The final sample 
comprised 86 Spanish-listed companies from the chosen sectors, with data 
covering twelve years, so we could construct an imbalanced data panel of 898 
observations (88 observations belong to the construction sector, 41 to the energy 
and water supply sector, 28 to extractives companies, 388 to industry firms and 
353 to companies in the service sector).
We conduct this study using secondary sources of information. The database 
of the CNMV (Spanish Security Exchange Commission) was the main resource 
used to gather information on ownership structure.
3.2 Measurement of variables
All the variables of this study are related to ownership structure, considering 
different types of blockholders or significant shareholders. CNMV in Spain 
determines at any time the percentage of capital that a shareholder must have 
to be considered as significant, being now this percentage at 3%; and even more, 
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Spanish companies listed on the Spanish stock exchange must inform in their 
corporate governance reports about the identity of their significant shareholders 
and the percentage of capital held by them. 
Under this premise, we measured domestic capital as the sum of the significant 
percentages of capital held by domestic blockholders (HyeogUg and Tomohiko, 
2013), it means Spanish great shareholders, which could be institutional or 
financial investors, companies of the same or other sectors and individual 
investors.
Foreign capital is determined as the sum of the significant percentages of 
capital held by foreign investors (Love et alii, 2009), being these investors again 
of different kinds, such as institutional or financial investors, companies of the 
same or other sectors and individual investors.
We considered institutional capital as the sum of significant participations held 
by institutions, like pension funds, insurance companies or investment societies 
(Ferris and Park, 2005; Zahra, 1996), with the exception of financial institutions 
and banks, both Spanish and foreign ones.
Financial capital is measured through the sum of significant participations 
held by financial institutions and banks (Tribo et alii, 2007), both from Spain 
and from other countries.
Capital of companies of the same sector is measured as the aggregation of significant 
percentages of ownership held by companies belonging to the same sector or in the 
same economic activity than the firm under consideration (Ito et alii, 2012).
Capital of companies of other sectors is measured as the aggregation of significant 
percentages of ownership held by companies belonging to different sectors or 
economic activities, different from the economic activity of the company under 
consideration, and excluding financial and institutional investors (Ito et alii, 
2012).
Board ownership is determined through the significant ownership held by the 
board of directors (Kim and Kim, 2015).
Executive ownership is measured as the significant ownership held by executive 
directors (Hoskisson et alii, 2002).
Affiliated ownership is calculated as the significant ownership held by affiliated 
directors (Hernández-Lara et alii, 2014).
Independent ownership is measured as the significant ownership held by 
independent and external directors (Zahra, 1996).
The amount of ownership held by every type of shareholder was calculated 
through the aggregation of the percentages of shares of the significant shareholders 
of this kind, being considered a shareholder as significant when having 3% or 
more of the company’s capital.
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4. Results
The statistical analyses of this work were carried out using R, version 3.2.0. (R 
Core Team, 2015). 
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics of ownership structure in terms of the 
most important types of blockholders, described as our variables. 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of ownership structure 
(percentages of significant capital held by blockholders)
Types of blockholders Min Max Mean Sd
Domestic 0.000 100.000 30.63 27.753
Foreign 0.000 99.74 13.77 21.933
Institutional 0.000 91.31 4.379 12.196
Financial 0.000 95.600 4.725 10.283
Companies of the same sector 0.000 99.74 8.458 19.940
Companies of other sectors 0.000 99.480 17.599 24.852
Board 0.000 100.000 54.07 26.934
Executive directors 0.000 72.560 5.324 13.360
Affiliated directors 0.000 99.48 37.07 28.147
Independent directors 0.000 99.740 11.672 19.610
N=902
As Table 1 shows, the mean values of the percentages of significant ownership 
held by the most relevant shareholders indicate that domestic capital (30.63%) 
and ownership held by the board (54.07%) are the highest, which means that 
the most common major shareholders in the case of innovative companies in 
Spain are directors and shareholders of the same country. Among the different 
types of directors, affiliated directors (37.07%) are the most relevant in terms of 
the percentage of shares they hold in such companies. The lowest percentages 
of capital are those held by institutional owners (4.379%), excluding financial 
institutions, and executives directors (5.324%).
To analyse the differences in the ownership structure considering different 
innovative sectors, we conducted one-way ANOVA analyses and determined the 
mean values of significant ownership held by the different blockholders in each 
sector. The results of these analyses are included in Table 2. 
22 23RIO, Nº 16, 2016
Juan Pablo Gonzales-Bustos, Ana Beatriz Hernández-Lara
Table 2: Mean values of ownership structure by sectors
Types of 
blockholders
Mean (%)
FEnergy 
and water 
suppy
Extractives Construction Industry Services
Domestic 26.732 34.498 45.887 26.328 31.131 15.04 ***
Foreign 35.789 2.047 10.660 15.116 11.500 162***
Institutional 4.880 3.490 0.759 5.233 4.202 5.093**
Financial 8.290 3.360 6.849 4.023 4.449 2.297+
Companies of the 
same sector 33.558 16.544 18.904 3.950 7.166 88.44***
Companies of other 
sectors 13.707 9.057 26.168 14.857 19.532 21.4***
Board 63.912 44.611 60.278 53.469 52.189 25.4***
Executive directors 0.767 2.658 3.977 7.263 4.035 18.1***
Affiliated directors 21.701 12.105 48.999 32.706 42.248 57.5***
Independent 
directors 41.443 29.848 7.301 13.499 5.906 88.42***
***p<0.001; **p<0.01; *p<0.05; +p<0.1
As Table 2 shows, again the most and least important blockhoders are 
the same when comparing the different Spanish innovative sectors. Domestic 
blockholders and the board are the most relevant shareholders. Both types 
of blockholders show the highest percentages of capital most of the times, 
considering the different economic innovative sectors. We must highlight only 
one exception, for companies in the “energy and water supply” industry. In this 
case, foreign blockholders (35.789%) are more important than domestic ones 
(26.732%), contrary to the others sectors. In addition, although the board 
ownership is the highest in this sector, it is due to the high percentage of 
ownership held by independent directors, not affiliate directors who are normally 
the type who owns normally more shares. The board ownership is the highest 
in all the sectors, especially due to the capital held by affiliate directors, with 
the exception of “energy and water supply” as we have established before, and 
“extractive industries”. Executive directors are the least relevant in terms of their 
ownership. Again, in these two sectors, the ownership of companies belonging 
to the same sector is more important than the ownership of companies from 
other activities, contrary to the other three sectors where it is more relevant 
the ownership held by companies developing different economic activities than 
the firm under consideration. In general, institutional, financial and executive 
blockholders are the ones less relevant in terms of their concentrated ownership. 
Another interesting result that we can extract from Table 2, is that there are 
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significant differences among economic innovative sectors in all the different 
types of blockholders taken into account. It means that the average values of 
concentrated ownership held by each type of blockholders in each sector cannot 
be considered the same.
This study is also interested in determining the evolution of the ownership 
structure in Spanish innovative companies over time. To this end, we develop 
graphical analyses of how the mean values of the variables considered have been 
evolving over time, and also by sectors.
Figure 1: Evolution of domestic capital
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diminishing over time. By sectors, Figure 2 shows that “energy and water supply” is the 
sector with highest domestic ownership, whilst “industry” has the smallest levels. We can 
also observe some oscillations in concentrated domestic capital of the different sectors, but 
these changes over time are not significant. The only significant differences can be found 
in the mean values of this kind of concentrated ownership when considering different 
innovative sectors. 
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Figures 3 and 4 are related to foreign capital. As we can see, foreign capital is low in 
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a little recession in 2014. The evolution of this variable is quite stable in all sectors, with 
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water supply”, which shows statistically significant higher levels. On the other hand, the 
sector with lower foreign capital is the “extractive industry”.  
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Figures 5 and 6 refer to institutional capital. Figure 5 indicates that the 
percentage of institutional ownership has been very low in the period considered, 
and it has been increasing just a little bit since 2012. As Figure 6 shows, the 
different sectors do not exhibit big changes over time, except “energy and water 
supply”, which has relevant levels of this type of ownership in the middle of the 
period under consideration. The sector with more foreign capital is “industry” and 
the one with lower levels of this kind of ownership is “construction”, but in none 
of the economic activities considered is this kind of ownership predominant.
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Figures 7 and 8 are related to financial capital. The percentage of this kind of 
concentrated ownership has evolved negatively since 2012. In addition, the evolution of 
this ownership has been quite irregular in all sectors over time, although at the end of the 
period all the sectors are quite close. “Energy and water supply” has been the sector with a 
major proportion of financial ownership and “extractives industries” are the sector with 
the fewest. 
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Figures 7 and 8 are related to financial capital. The percentage of this kind 
of concentrated ownership has evolved negatively since 2012. In addition, the 
evolution of this ownership has been quite irregular in all sectors over time, 
although at the end of the period all the sectors are quite close. “Energy and water 
supply” has been the sector with a major proportion of financial ownership and 
“extractives industries” are the sector with the fewest.
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Figures 9 and 10 show the percentages of capital held by companies belonging to the 
same sector than the firm under consideration. Their evolution has been quite irregular 
with negative tendency since 2006. By sectors, relevant differences can be observed, 
although the evolution is quite stable in each one. The “extractive industry” has the 
highest level of this kind of property, whilst the “industry” has the lowest. 
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Figures 11 and 12 are related to concentrated ownership held by companies of other 
sectors. We can observe again an evolution quite unstable, with successive ups and downs, 
but with a general negative tendency, especially since 2007. By sectors, we can observe 
that some economic activities are more stable than others regarding the proportion of 
capital held by companies belonging to other sectors. The sectors with bigger changes in 
the evolution of this variable are “energy and water supply” and “extractive industries”. 
The sector where this kind of blockhoders is more important is “construction”, and where 
is less important, it depends on the moment, but in general terms are “industry” and 
“extractives”. 
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Figures 13 and 14 show concentrated ownership held by the board of directors 
in Spanish companies belonging to innovative sectors. The general evolution 
highlights a positive growth in this type of shareholder until 2008, and a decrease 
after that. Considering the different sectors, although the values and tendency are 
different in each economic activity, at the end, it can be observed that the mean 
values in the proportion of the board ownership is quite close considering the 
different sectors. “Energy and water supply” and “construction” have the highest 
proportion of this kind of ownership, and “extractives” and “industry” the lowest. 
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Figure 18: Evolution affiliated capital by sectors
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Finally, the last Figures are related to concentrated ownership held by different kind of 
directors. Figures 15 and 16 refer to executive ownership; Figures 17 and 18 are related to 
affiliated ownership; and Figures 19 and 20 refer to independent ownership. The general 
tendency regarding the existence of executive and affiliated blockhoders is quite similar, 
with an increase at the beginning of the period under consideration, and a decrease 
afterwards. It is contrary to what happens with independent ownership, which shows an 
important growth since 2011. Comparing these three types of blockhoders, the most 
relevant are affiliated directors, followed by independent directors, and finally the less 
important are executive ones. By sectors, executive ownership is especially relevant in 
“industry” and the lowest importance of this kind of capital is shown by “extractives” and 
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Finally, the last es are related to concentrated ownership held by different 
kind of directors. Figures 15 and 16 refer t  ex cutive ownership; Figures 17 and 
18 are r lated to affiliated ownership; and Figures 19 a  20 refer to independent 
ow ership. The en ral endency regardi g the xistence of executive and 
affiliated blockhoders is quite similar, with an i crease at the begi ning of th  
period under consideration, and a decrease afterwards. It is contrary to hat 
happens with independent ownership, which shows an important growth since 
2011. Comparing these three types of blockhoders, the most relevant are affiliated 
directors, followed by independent directors, and finally the less important are 
executive ones. By sectors, executive ownership is especially relevant in “industry” 
and the lowest importance of this kind of capital is shown by “extractives” and 
“energy and water supply”. In terms of affiliated ownership, the sector where this 
kind of capital is highest is “construction” and “services” and where it is lower is 
in the “extractive industries”. Finally, regarding independent ownership, in “energy 
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and water supply” is where this kind of capital is more important, and in “services” 
and “construction” is where the relevance of these blockhoders is lower. 
Table 3 indicates the mean values by sector and year of each of the variables 
of this study, and also includes statistics tests to analyse the effects of time and 
the economic activity on the mean values of the variables considered. As we can 
see, the mean values of all the variables are significantly different amongst sectors. 
On the contrary, the effect of time is not significant. The results confirm that time 
only yields significant differences in the proportion of executive ownership. It 
means that the negative evolution of executive ownership is significant over time. 
On the other hand, for the rest of the types of significant shareholders, we have 
not detected significant differences over time.
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5. Discussion and conclusions
The main goal of this study was to develop a longitudinal analysis of ownership 
structure of Spanish companies that belong to innovative economic sectors. 
Our purpose was just to describe who are the main blockholders of innovative 
companies in Spain and explore whether or not some significant differences can 
be found when comparing over time and also among different innovative sectors. 
Therefore, this study is far from traditional research on this topic that is normally 
based on analysing the effects that ownership concentration and significant stocks 
held by different types of stockholders exert on innovation. Previous results of 
this research have not been conclusive, which lead us to make a first step in this 
matter, and develop a descriptive analysis trying to state if it is possible to extract 
some common traits when ownership structure of Spanish innovative companies 
are considered, comparing its evolution over time and also among different 
innovative economic sectors. These conclusions could be especially relevant in 
a context like Spain where the government has been trying to boost R&D and 
innovation activities in the last years but where the innovation intensity is still 
below the average of European Union and also OECD countries (Hernández-
Lara et alii, 2014).
The main findings of this study show that the most common major 
shareholders in the case of innovative companies in Spain are directors and 
shareholders of the same country. Among the different types of directors, affiliated 
directors are the most relevant in terms of the percentage of shares they hold in 
such companies. The lowest percentages of capital are those held by institutional 
owners, excluding financial institutions, and executives directors. When different 
innovative economic sectors are compared, again the most and least important 
blockholders are the same; domestic blockholders and the board are the most 
relevant shareholders. We must highlight only one exception, for companies in 
the “energy and water supply” industry. In this case, foreign blockholders are more 
important than domestic ones, and independent directors are the most relevant 
shareholders in the board, not affiliate directors who are normally the type 
who owns more shares. In “energy and water supply” and “extractive industry”, 
the ownership of companies belonging to the same sector is more important 
than the ownership of companies from other activities, contrary to the other 
three sectors, “construction”, “industry” and “services”. In general, institutional, 
financial and executive blockholders are the ones less relevant in terms of their 
concentrated ownership. These are the general conclusions about who are 
the main blockholders when different innovative Spanish economic sectors 
are compared. Also, significant differences were found in the mean values of 
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concentrated ownership held by different blockholders among sectors. It means 
that ownership structure is not really the same among these sectors; each sector 
has their own particularities regarding the percentages of capital held by different 
blockhoders. Nevertheless, although the percentages of capital were not exactly 
the same, it does not invalidate that the most and least relevant shareholders, in 
terms of their concentrated ownership, were the same in the different innovative 
economic sectors compared. 
The singularities observed mainly in the case of the “energy and water supply” 
sector are motivated by the low number of companies in this sector and the 
specific ownership structure of some of its companies, characterised by a high 
presence of foreign and independent blockholders, which at the end exert a clear 
influence on the average values of the whole sector. We could have decided to 
remove these companies of our sample, but we considered that this decision 
would damage to obtain a real picture of the ownership structure of the Spanish 
stock exchange listed companies in the “energy and water supply” sector. 
Other important finding of this research was that the effect of time was not 
significant. Specifically, time only yielded significant differences in the proportion 
of executive ownership. For the rest of the types of significant shareholders, we 
have not detected significant differences over time, which means that ownership 
structure in Spanish companies belonging to innovative economic sectors was 
stable over time.
The results obtained in this research show a ownership structure in innovative 
sectors that agrees with the ownership structure that Spanish companies have 
in general, with a high capital concentration (Ortega-Argiles et alii, 2005), 
especially held by banks and other financial entities (Tribo et alii, 2007), and a 
significant participation also of the board of directors (Acero-Fraile and Alcalde-
Fradejas, 2014). Although it is beyond the objective of this study to compare the 
ownership structure of innovative and non-innovative companies, if we compare 
our results regarding the ownership structure in innovative sectors and what has 
been previously stated by research on the ownership structure of Spanish firms 
in general, we cannot observe a lot of differences. It could mean that Spanish 
innovative companies do not have a specific ownership structure that really 
explains the orientation of these companies towards innovation.
In addition, if we compare our results with those obtained by previous research, 
and despite the inconclusive conclusions of this research, it does not seem that 
ownership structure of Spanish innovative sectors points towards significant 
shareholders that previous research shown as the most proactive towards 
innovation. Firstly, most of the studies advocate for a positive influence of foreign 
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ownership on innovation (Choi et alii, 2011; Love et alii, 2009; Resende et alii, 
2014) and, more specifically, on R&D expenses (Ferris and Park, 2005; Hwang 
et alii, 2013; Lee, 2012; HyeogUg and Tomohiko, 2013). These authors argue 
that foreign ownership offers better options to access to resources for innovation 
and R&D development (Brugger and Stuckey, 1987; Choi et alii, 2011), allow 
technological resources to be transferred, a major technical collaboration, and 
higher exchange of managerial resources and funding (Love et alii, 2009). 2015). 
From our results, domestic ownership seems to be much more important than 
foreign ownership. Secondly, most of the studies also highlight the conservative 
nature of financial entities and banks, which from our results are one of the 
most common types of institutional blockholders in Spanish innovative sectors. 
This negative relationship is mainly explained by the business links that banks 
maintain with firms, in the form of loans and credits, which expose banks, to the 
uncertainty of R&D and innovation (Tribo et alii, 2007). Again, our results point 
to a relevant blockholder that does not seem to be very proactive to innovation. 
Finally, within the board, the most independent directors, who previous research 
undelines as proactive towards innovation, due to their major involvement in 
discussion and their richer experience and knowledge about other companies, 
are not the most numerous in Spanish innovative sector, neither the ownership 
held by them. All in all, our results confirm that ownership structure in Spanish 
companies does not seem to foster an appropriate innovative environment for 
innovation.
This research that analyses the ownership structure of Spanish companies 
belonging to innovative sectors does not pretend to explain or predict innovation. 
Our purpose is more limited, as we try to contribute to the existing literature 
by showing who are the major shareholders in Spanish innovative companies, 
and what are, if any, the most significant differences in the main blockhoders 
when different economic innovative sectors are compared and also differences 
over time. From our results, we extract some significant practical contributions, 
like the need to diversify the ownership structure of our companies in order to 
gain a major orientation towards innovation, letting other blockhoders to enter 
in the capital composition of Spanish companies more significantly, especially 
foreign capital of companies with high innovation indicators, and institutional 
and independent ownership. Finally, the findings obtained could serve to propose 
more ambitious future research that establishes what possible effects ownership 
structure could have on innovation. 
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